China’s economic deleveraging pressure is more than destocking

At the beginning of the year, it is predicted that the Chinese economy will see a rebound in the second or third quarter. The basic logic is the inventory cycle, that is, the entire destocking and restocking cycle is about 36 months, until the second quarter of this year or the latest. In the third quarter, the destocking process was completed, and the next step was to replenish the inventory. But in fact, the process of destocking is very slow. So far, the inventory of most industries is still at a high level. The Chinese economy seems to be a bit of a food, which requires reflection on the logic of the "inventory cycle". Corporate accounts receivable and bank overdue loans climbed as of August 23, and the total size of accounts receivable of 1437 listed companies in the interim report reached 803.9 billion yuan, a sharp increase of 45% compared with the same period last year of 555 billion yuan. The rise in corporate receivables not only indicates an increase in the overall debt level of the enterprise, but also reflects the deterioration of the business conditions of the enterprise. Correspondingly, this year's bank's bad debt rate has also increased significantly. Since the bad debt rate is a very lagging indicator, it is better to observe the business situation of the company from the rapid growth of bank loan overdue. For example, China Merchants Bank’s mid-year report showed that overdue loans at the end of June were 18.8 billion yuan, an increase of 5.2 billion yuan from the end of the previous year. Among them, overdue loans of three months to three months to one year were respectively 10.5 billion yuan and 2.7 billion yuan. Compared with the beginning of the year, it has increased by 62% and 174%. In the period of rapid economic growth, increasing leverage can win a higher return on investment. Once the economy falls, the average profit of most industries or investment activities will move downwards. Even higher than the rate of return on investment, investment will not pay off, especially for companies that use high leverage. From the perspective of industry classification, the current asset-liability ratio of real estate enterprises is about 70%, the debt ratio of the five major power groups exceeds 80%, the debt ratio of the Ministry of Railways exceeds 60%, and the debt ratio of photovoltaic manufacturing enterprises exceeds 90%. From the regional classification, The leverage ratio of enterprises in the Yangtze River Delta region should be the highest in China, especially in Zhejiang, and the leverage ratio of enterprises in the eastern region is higher than that in the central and western regions. According to OECD standards, it is dangerous for corporate debt to account for more than 90% of GDP, but in 2011 China's corporate debt accounted for 107% of GDP, almost the highest in the world. What is more worrying is that many companies are not using loans to supplement working capital or additional industrial investment, but instead invest in real estate, minerals or commodities, or even buy leveraged financial products in order to obtain excess investment. income. From the frequent incidents of Wenzhou enterprise owners’ debt evasion to the fact that the capital chain ruptures in Shanghai steel trade enterprises are not uncommon, and bank loans are overdue, the Yangtze River Delta region, which has maintained the lowest bad debt rate for many years, has now become the fastest rising bad debt rate. Area. At present, negative factors such as the rise in corporate debt ratio and the expansion of the loss side have been transmitted to banks, causing a causal relationship with the rise in bank bad debt rates and the substantial increase in overdue loans. With the increase in the number of enterprises and banks involved, the triangle debt problem that has appeared in history will eventually be formed. De-leverage is unlikely to lead to a new round of economic crisis . Compared with de-stocking, the former is to control risks, crisis, and survival, while the latter is business contraction, which may not lead to crisis. Because the decline of this round of economic growth is the result of policy-active regulation (so most scholars judge the economic cycle from the logic of inventory changes), but with the unsmooth process of destocking, the Chinese economy The problems at the level are revealed, such as the increase in accounts receivable, the slow sales of products, the high level of market interest rates, the extension of loans, and the arrears of debts until the spread of triangular debts. This triangular debt contains the two most typical risks: First, the capital lending chain formed by small and micro enterprises and private high-interest loans has been exploding due to overcapacity and falling demand, because “debt” runs, because of “debt” The number of lock-ups is frequent; the second is the exchange of funds between state-owned large enterprises and local government financing platforms and banks and suppliers. Due to the low return on investment, the potential for payment and principal and interest repayment is still at risk. The process, the short-term trigger of a wide range of financial consequences is unlikely. The process of clearing the triangular debt is the process of de-leveraging. The sharp rise in real estate, gold, and various types of minerals over the past 10 years is actually a process of increasing leverage by governments, businesses, and residents. The result is a rise in the scale of local government debt, an increase in corporate asset-liability ratios, and some personal investments. The process of adding leverage through bank mortgage loans or private loan sharks. Compared with the US deleveraging process after the subprime mortgage crisis, China is currently facing the pressure of de-leveraging. It is only that China's current asset bubble is not high, and so far the house price has not fallen sharply. Therefore, the de-leverage is not very strong. Generally speaking, the triangular debt problem is only partial, mainly in the Yangtze River Delta region, but not serious in the central and western regions. In addition, the data released by the Ministry of Finance showed that the asset-liability ratio of state-owned enterprises in the country from January to July was 64.6%, an increase of 0.7 percentage points over the same period of the previous year. Although it was on the high side, there was no sign of rapid increase. From the bank's bad debt rate, although the rise is faster, the official data shows that the overall bad debt rate is still controlled within 1%. Compared with the early 1990s and early 2000, both the triangular debt problem and the bank's bad debt rate are small and ugly. After all, after more than 20 years of development in the Chinese economy, the standardization of banks and enterprises has increased remarkably. Both the commercial credit system and the degree of marketization have made great progress. Moreover, the total debt ratio of the Chinese government sector is about 40%, which is not high compared to other emerging countries. Moreover, the assets of state-owned enterprises plus state-owned land, minerals, etc. are beyond imagination, and can also be used as a financial source for debt relief when necessary, indicating that government departments also have sufficient strength to avoid crises. Therefore, this round of clean-up of triangle debt and deleveraging is unlikely to trigger an economic crisis. However, from another perspective, due to the stabilization measures in policy regulation, the possibility of asset bubble puncture is reduced, and the possibility of introducing policy measures is relatively small. This may also mean that the process of de-leveraging will be slow. . The economic recovery time may delay this round of destocking process has been close to two years, but the effect is not satisfactory. According to the data of listed companies, the total inventory of 1269 listed companies was 1.92 trillion yuan, an increase of 7.5% compared with the inventory amount of 1.79 trillion at the beginning of this year, indicating that the total inventory of listed companies did not fall in the past six months. Rise. In terms of industries, the industries with high inventory pressure are mainly concentrated in the coal, steel and other industries. The inventory of automobiles, home appliances and real estate industries is also at a historical high, while the high-end consumer goods industries such as liquor have just begun to go in stock. Why is this round of inventory going to be so slow? The first is that this round of adjustment is the inevitable retreat after the rapid economic growth in the past 10 years. The original retreat should start in 2008, but due to the 4 trillion investment plan launched in response to the US subprime mortgage crisis, the upcoming landing The economy took off again. Therefore, destocking and de-capacity are actually the compression of the accumulated supply capacity over the past 10 years, including internal supply capacity and external supply capacity. For example, China's total exports have accounted for more than 10% of global exports. This is basically a ceiling. If we continue to expand exports, we will face pressure from rising labor and other factors of production factors. Another example is that house prices have risen for more than 10 years. Whether they continue to stabilize or fall, leveraging investment in real estate needs to be leveraged. For another example, China’s car ownership has exceeded 100 million, and the stage of high sales growth has passed. These three cases actually show that China's external demand and domestic demand have actually reached a bottleneck stage. To further increase, it is necessary to adjust the structure and achieve industrial upgrading. Secondly, the central government aims to stabilize growth, so local governments, enterprises and individuals have the expectation that “once the adjustment is over and the economy will take off again”, so there is not enough strength in destocking and de-capacity, there is luck, and even Continue to increase inventory. Third, the central government actually recognizes the crux of the Chinese economy, so it is unlikely to launch a large-scale stimulus policy again. The current active fiscal policy and prudent monetary policy are actually difficult to make the economy pick up. Because the proportion of private investment is close to nearly two-thirds of the total size of fixed assets, and the current de-leverage pressure is also the biggest, the pressure of private de-leverage is also the biggest. Look at the regulatory space for monetary policy. Although in theory, there is a large space for interest rate cuts and RRR cuts, the interest rate marketization has increased a lot. The current market interest rate is still at a high level, which partly reflects the rising cost of capital caused by de-leverage. Pressure, so the interest rate cut is not significant. The RRR reduction is related to the credit demand. The current new loan scale is lower than expected, so the need for RRR reduction is also limited, and the RRR mitigation effect on the economy is more limited. Due to the base, it is estimated that GDP in the fourth quarter will rise back to around 8%, but this is not a sign that the economy is bottoming out. Similarly, indicators such as the growth rate of fixed asset investment should be treated with caution. Although the growth rate in January-July is still above 20%, this may not be an effective indicator for observing whether the economy has bottomed out. More reliable is the power generation index, the low growth rate of power generation and the high growth rate of fixed assets obviously do not match, but it is consistent with the negative growth of corporate profitability. Compared with the de-stocking cycle, the process of deleveraging begins shortly, so the duration will be longer. Moreover, the destocking is mainly corporate behavior, including de-capacity, and the scope of deleveraging is wide, involving the behavior of the whole society. , including government de-leverage (local government to reduce investment through debt repayment), bank deleveraging (to off-balance sheet business), corporate deleveraging and residents deleveraging. Therefore, the fundamental reason why the destocking process cannot be completed on schedule is that the Chinese economy has already encountered a growth bottleneck, structural problems have become prominent, and the possibility of economic growth is more L-shaped. The traditional means of stimulating the economy has not been used, and must pass deep. Level reforms to resolve contradictions at all levels, to change space with time, to win the reform dividend.

Crane Sole Plate

Crane Sole Plate is used under crane rail. The primary function of soleplates is to provide rails with a flat and smooth resting surface. Soleplates are used to support the rails in situations where concrete is not strong enough to support crane rails. Depending on the load and the type of rail, soleplates can be made continuous or individual.


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Material: Mild steel

Chemical composition %:

C: 0.14-0.22, Si:0.3 max; Mn:0.3-0.65; P:0.05 max; S: 0.05 Max


Mechanical properties:

Tensile strength Yield point Hardness Elongation Proof load

Bolt ≥375Mpa ≥235Mpa ≥120HB ≥23% -


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